Consumer Financial Services Arbitration: What Does the Future Hold After Concepcion? by Kaplinsky, Alan S. & Levin, Mark J.
Journal of Business & Technology Law
Volume 8 | Issue 2 Article 1
Consumer Financial Services Arbitration: What
Does the Future Hold After Concepcion?
Alan S. Kaplinsky
Mark J. Levin
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Consumer Protection Law
Commons, Contracts Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Litigation
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Business & Technology Law by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alan S. Kaplinsky, & Mark J. Levin, Consumer Financial Services Arbitration: What Does the Future Hold After Concepcion?, 8 J. Bus. &
Tech. L. 345 (2013)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl/vol8/iss2/1
 Journal of Business & Technology Law 345 
Alan S. Kaplinsky and Mark J. Levin* 
Consumer Financial Services Arbitration: What 
Does the Future Hold After Concepcion? 
I. Introduction 
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was enacted in 1925 to overcome a long-
entrenched judicial hostility towards arbitration, and it established a liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration that is applicable in both federal and state courts.1 
Arbitration has played a special role in resolving disputes between consumers and 
companies. As the United States Supreme Court itself emphasized, “Congress, when 
enacting [the FAA], had the needs of consumers, as well as others, in mind.”2 The 
legislative history of the FAA reveals that its drafters believed that “the Act, by 
avoiding ‘the delay and expense of litigation,’ will appeal ‘to big business and little 
business alike, . . . corporate interests [and] individuals.’ Indeed, arbitration’s 
advantages often would seem helpful to individuals, say, complaining about a 
product, who need a less expensive alternative to litigation.”3 
The importance of arbitration as an alternative to court litigation for resolving 
disputes, including disputes between a consumer and a company, is reflected in 
hundreds of judicial opinions that define and refine the role played by arbitration in 
American society. The Supreme Court alone has issued more than thirty significant 
opinions dealing with arbitration.4 
© 2013 Alan S. Kaplinsky, Mark J. Levin  
 * Alan S. Kaplinsky and Mark J. Levin are partners with Ballard Spahr LLP in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
Mr. Kaplinsky is the Chair of the firm’s Consumer Financial Services Group, and Mr. Levin is a member of the 
Group who specializes in complex litigation. Mr. Kaplinsky is a former Chair of the American Bar Association 
Business Law Section’s Committee on Consumer Financial Services and its Subcommittee on Alternative 
Dispute Resolution. Both Mr. Kaplinsky and Mr. Levin are admitted to practice law in the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 68–401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2006)); Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 2. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (citing S. REP. NO. 69-536, at 3 
(1924)). 
 3. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 69-536, at 3 (1924) and citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-542, at 13 (1982)). 
 4. See, e.g., Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012); Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. 
Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); KPMG 
LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23 (2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Rent-A-Center, 
W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); 
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In addition, over the course of time, consumer arbitration agreements have 
evolved from short, one-paragraph general provisions to multi-page, detailed 
agreements filled with consumer-friendly features which make arbitration more 
beneficial to the consumer than court litigation.5 Such features include: contractual 
fee-shifting to the company of attorney and expert fees, if the consumer prevails; 
company payment of arbitration fees, whether or not the consumer prevails; 
preservation of all substantive rights and remedies the consumer would have in 
litigation; an unfettered right of the consumer to opt-out of arbitration within some 
reasonable period of time after the arbitration provision becomes effective if he or 
she chooses; establishment of the venue of any arbitration hearing near the 
consumer’s residence; and a provision requiring the company to pay a specific 
amount (typically $7,500 or $10,000) to the consumer (plus fees and costs 
otherwise payable) if the arbitrator finds it liable for the amount demanded by the 
consumer prior to the initiation of the arbitration.6 
Nevertheless, many courts, plaintiffs’ class action lawyers, and consumer 
advocacy groups vigorously resisted the enforcement of consumer arbitration 
agreements, particularly those containing class action waivers.7 Recently, in the 
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009); Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009); Hall St. Assocs., 
LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, 
Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003); PacifiCare Health Sys. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 
537 U.S. 79 (2002); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002); Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 
(2001); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 
(1996); First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52 
(1995); Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. 265; Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20; Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Perry 
v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 460 U.S. 1; Prima Paint Corp. v. 
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 
448 (1957); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 5. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly” Arbitration 
Clauses After AT&T Mobility vs. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 853–57 (2012) (noting that 
arbitration clauses increasingly “promise to pick up the tab for all initiation fees, deposits, and costs of the 
arbitral proceeding”). Compare Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 4–5 (discussing a short “broad 
arbitration clause” that makes no mention of the party that drafted the clause paying for any arbitration costs), 
with Verizon Wireless Customer Agreement Arbitration Clause (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.proandcontracts.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2011/09/2011.09.08-Verizon-Wireless-Arbitration-Clause.pdf (a more recent, two-page 
arbitration agreement that indicates Verizon will pay costs of arbitration).  
 6. See Gilles, supra note 5, at 853–57 (2012) (noting the increase of fee-shifting provisions); see also, e.g., 
What if I Am not Satisfied with the Resolution AT&T Offers Me for a Problem I Am Experiencing?, AT&T 
WIRELESS, http://www.att.com/esupport/article.jsp?sid=47114&cv=820&_requestid=1349995#fbid=if9D_7mjrR4 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2013) (declaring, among other things, that AT&T will pay filing, administration and 
arbitrator fees for arbitration commenced by the consumer). 
 7. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 632–36 (2012) (noting two principal legal challenges to class action waivers: 
state law unconscionability and vindication of federal statutory rights). A class action waiver is an agreement 
that neither party will participate in a class action in court or in arbitration with respect to any claim that is 
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landmark case of AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the FAA preempts state laws that refuse to enforce consumer arbitration 
agreements containing class action waivers on unconscionability or public policy 
grounds.8 Shortly thereafter, in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, the Court 
once again reinforced that “[s]tate and federal courts must enforce the Federal 
Arbitration Act . . . with respect to all arbitration agreements covered by that 
statute.”9 Most recently, in Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v. Howard, the Court 
reinforced that the FAA is “the Supreme Law of the Land” and once the Court has 
interpreted the FAA, “it is the duty of other courts to respect that understanding of 
the governing rule of law.”10 
While in theory Concepcion, Marmet, and Nitro-Lift should have been the last 
word on the subject, in reality, consumer arbitration is presently at a crossroads. 
Some courts, and many class action lawyers and consumer advocacy groups, have 
continued to try to devise ways to evade the Supreme Court’s edicts.11 In particular, 
there has been an effort to create a significant exception to Concepcion that would 
refuse to enforce a consumer arbitration agreement that prevents consumers from 
vindicating their alleged statutory rights.12 That issue has now reached the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which is poised to decide it in the spring of 2013.13 Moreover, 
consumer arbitration is currently under the microscope of the federal Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which has the power under certain conditions 
proscribed in Section 1028 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
subject to arbitration. See William M. Howard, Annotation, Validity of Arbitration Clause Precluding Class 
Actions, 13 A.L.R. 6th 145 (2006). For examples of class action waivers, see, e.g., Lowry v. JP Morgan Chase 
Bank, N.A., No. 4:12CV00816, 2012 WL 3988997, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 11, 2012); Bradberry v. T-Mobile 
USA, Inc., No. C06-6567 CW, 2007 WL 1241936, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2007).  
 8. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 9. 132 S. Ct. at 1202. 
 10. Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2012) (internal quotation omitted). 
 11. Shortly after Concepcion was decided, the consumer advocacy group Public Justice created a blueprint 
on how to attack consumer arbitration provisions in the aftermath of Concepcion. See Leslie Bailey & Paul 
Bland, How Courts Can and Should Limit AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, PUBLIC JUSTICE, 
http://publicjustice.net/ConcepcionMemo (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). Also, an organization named Consumers 
Count, according to the press release announcing its formation, has the goal of eliminating the use of consumer 
arbitration. Press Release, Consumers Count, New Consumer Advocacy Group, Consumers Count, Formed to 
Restore Individuals’ Constitutional Right to Take Grievances Against Corporations to Court (Oct. 3, 2012), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/new-consumer-advocacy-group-consumers-count-formed-to-restore-
individuals-constitutional-right-to-take-grievances-against-corporations-to-court-2012-10-03. Consumers 
Count’s co-founders say in the release that the organization “is designed to turn arbitration into an unexpected 
nightmare for corporations” by inundating companies with mass individual arbitrations that will be so 
burdensome that companies will “disavow arbitration.” Id. Some courts have also attempted to side-step 
Concepcion by purporting to find the arbitration provision unconscionable under state law for reasons other 
than the class action waiver itself. See, e.g., Brewer v. Miss. Title Loans, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 486, 487 (Mo. 2012) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 191 (2012). 
 12. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 667 F.3d 204, 219 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 
594 (2012) (discussed infra Part III). 
 13. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (granting certiorari to Am. Express Co., 
667 F.3d 204). 
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Protection Act to significantly curtail, if not totally eliminate, the use of arbitration 
provisions in consumer agreements.14 After discussing Concepcion, this Article 
examines these post-Concepcion developments in more detail. 
II. The Road to Concepcion 
Over the years, the Supreme Court, recognizing the many benefits that flow from 
the use of arbitration to resolve disputes, has taken special pains to protect the FAA 
from its detractors. In particular, the Court has held that: (a) the FAA applies in 
state as well as federal courts15 and preempts inconsistent state laws;16 (b) arbitration 
cannot be discriminated against or singled out for special treatment;17 (c) an 
arbitration provision must be enforced as written,18 even though arbitration is more 
informal than, and does not permit as much discovery as, court proceedings;19 (d) 
an arbitration provision must be enforced even if piecemeal litigation is the result;20 
(e) enforcement of an arbitration provision cannot be denied based upon 
speculation;21 (f) an arbitration provision must be enforced even if the contract in 
which it is contained is alleged to be unlawful or void ab initio;22 and (g) an 
arbitration cannot proceed on a class basis unless there is affirmative evidence that 
both parties so intended.23 
 14. Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 1028, 124 Stat. 1376, 2003–05 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2006 & 
Supp. V 2011)). 
 15. Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1202 (2012) (“State and federal courts 
must enforce the Federal Arbitration Act. . .”) (per curiam). 
 16. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 3 (1984) (“In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as 
well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements.”). 
 17. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996) (“Congress precluded States from singling 
out arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed ‘upon the same 
footing as other contracts.’” (quoting Sherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974))). 
 18. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478–79 
(1989). 
 19. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (“[B]y agreeing to arbitrate, a party 
‘trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and 
expedition of arbitration.’” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 
(1985))). 
 20. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983) (“Under the 
Arbitration Act, an arbitration agreement must be enforced notwithstanding the presence of other persons who 
are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement.”). 
 21. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000) (“The ‘risk’ that Randolph will 
be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.”). 
 22. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446 (2006) (“[W]e conclude that because 
respondents challenge the Agreement, but not specifically its arbitration provisions, those provisions are 
enforceable apart from the remainder of the contract.”); see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. 
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967) (“[T]he federal court is instructed to order arbitration to proceed once it is 
satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply (with the arbitration 
agreement) is not in issue. . . . But the statutory language does not permit the federal court to consider claims of 
fraud in the inducement of the contract generally.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 23. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010). 
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It was against this rich backdrop of arbitration decisions that the Supreme Court 
decided Concepcion. The case arose out of a dispute over $30.22.24 AT&T advertised 
that its phone was free, but it charged $30.22 in sales tax based on the phone’s full 
retail value.25 It was promptly sued in a class action for false advertising and fraud.26 
There was an arbitration provision with a class action waiver in the wireless service 
agreement between AT&T and its customers, and AT&T moved to compel 
arbitration.27 AT&T contended that any arbitration had to take place on an 
individual, not a classwide, basis because the arbitration provision stated that the 
arbitrator did not have authority to conduct class arbitration.28 
AT&T’s arbitration provision also had a number of consumer-friendly features. 
For example, the consumer paid no arbitration costs unless the claim was deemed 
frivolous by the arbitrator;29 regardless of the amount of the consumer’s claim, 
AT&T had to pay the consumer a minimum of $7,500 (now, $10,000), plus double 
attorneys’ fees if the arbitrator awarded the consumer more than AT&T’s final 
settlement offer before an arbitrator was appointed (known as a “bump-up” 
clause);30 the arbitrator was authorized to award any form of individual relief 
(including punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and injunctive relief) that would be 
available to consumers in court;31 AT&T waived any right to recover its own 
attorneys’ fees from the consumer regardless of the outcome of the arbitration;32 
arbitration took place in the county where the consumer resided;33 for claims under 
$10,000, the consumer could choose whether arbitration will be in person, by 
telephone, or on written submission;34 the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA), which for more than a decade has rigorously adhered to consumer due 
process protocols requiring fairness in arbitrations between consumers and 
companies, was named as the administrator;35 and consumers and their attorneys 
were not required to keep arbitration results confidential, and could bring issues to 
the attention of government enforcement agencies.36 
 24. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1744–45. 
 28. Id. at 1744. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.; What if I Am not Satisfied with the Resolution AT&T Offers Me for a Problem I Am Experiencing?, 
supra note 6. 
 31. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (2011). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 59a, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893) (providing AT&T’s 
original contract, which states arbitrations “will be administered by the AAA”); AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC., 
CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL 34 (2007), available at http://www.adr.org/cs/idcplg?IdcService=GET_FILE 
&dDocName=ADRSTG_005014&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased. 
 36. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 35, at 6. 
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The federal district court reluctantly denied AT&T’s motion to compel 
arbitration based on the “Discover Bank Rule,” so-called because it is derived from 
the California Supreme Court opinion in Discover Bank v. Superior Court.37 Under 
the Discover Bank Rule, a class action waiver is unconscionable when it is: (1) 
“found in a consumer contract of adhesion” drafted by a party with superior 
bargaining power, (2) in a setting in which “disputes between the contracting 
parties predictably involve small amounts of damages,” and (3) “alleged that the 
party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately 
cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money.”38 
The district court found that AT&T established that the Concepcions could 
vindicate their rights in an individual arbitration.39 However, AT&T did not show 
that bilateral arbitration was an adequate substitute for the deterrent effects of a 
class action.40 The court found that the Plaintiffs “were better off” individually 
pursuing their claims in arbitration because their net recovery would probably be 
larger and more quickly paid than in a class action.41 But it concluded that it had to 
faithfully adhere to California’s policy of favoring class litigation and class 
arbitration because only a class action would protect the thousands of putative class 
members who did not even know that their rights were violated.42 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court after holding that there 
was no FAA preemption.43 The Ninth Circuit found that the FAA did not expressly 
preempt the Discover Bank Rule because that Rule did not single out arbitration for 
special treatment.44 The court observed that all class action waivers, whether within 
or outside an arbitration provision, are unconscionable under California law.45 It 
further concluded that the FAA also did not implicitly preempt the Discover Bank 
Rule because the Rule did not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of 
Congress’ two objectives in the FAA.46 According to the Ninth Circuit, those two 
objectives were (1) placing arbitration agreements on the same footing as other 
contracts, and (2) promoting the efficient and expeditious resolution of claims.47 
That set the stage for Supreme Court review. AT&T’s certiorari petition raised 
the following question: “Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts states from 
 37. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (citing Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 
5216255, at *12–13 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008)); see also Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 
(2005) (establishing the “Discover Bank Rule”). 
 38. Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1211 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 39. Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *12. 
 40. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (citing Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *14). 
 41. Id. at 1753 (citing Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *12). 
 42. See Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *13–14. 
 43. Laster v. AT&T Mobility, 584 F.3d 849, 859 (2009). 
 44. Id. at 857 (citing Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Serv. Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 987 (2007)). 
 45. Id. at 857–59 (citing Shroyer, 498 F.3d at 990). 
 46. Id. at 859. 
 47. Id. at 857. 
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conditioning the enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the availability of 
particular procedures — here, classwide arbitration — when those procedures are 
not necessary to ensure that the parties to the arbitration agreement are able to 
vindicate their claims.”48 
The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, and joined in by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy and Thomas (who also wrote a separate 
concurring opinion), emphasized that under Section 2 of the FAA, an agreement to 
arbitrate is “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”49 The Court held that Section 2 
of the FAA preempts the Discover Bank Rule classifying most class action waivers as 
unconscionable.50 According to the Court, Section 2’s savings clause does not 
preserve state law defenses that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the 
FAA’s objectives.51 
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, Justice Scalia identified a third objective of the 
FAA, which he described as the “principal purpose” of the FAA: ensuring that 
arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.52 The Discover Bank 
Rule required that class arbitration be made available as a condition of enforcing 
the arbitration agreement — i.e., either the parties agree to class arbitration or they 
get no arbitration at all.53 But the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with 
the fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent 
with the parties’ contractual agreement and the FAA. 
The Court reiterated a point previously made in Stolt-Nielson v. AnimalFeeds 
Int’l Corp. that class arbitration (unless affirmatively consented to by both parties) 
is patently inconsistent with the FAA.54 In Stolt-Nielson, the Court held that 
ordering class arbitration when the arbitration provision is silent on the subject of 
class arbitration is inconsistent with and forbidden by the FAA: 
Classwide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional and 
different procedures and involving higher stakes. Confidentiality becomes 
more difficult. And while it is theoretically possible to select an arbitrator 
with some expertise relevant to the class-certification question, arbitrators 
are not generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects 
of certification, such as the protection of absent parties.55 
 48. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893). 
 49. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)). 
 50. Id. at 1753. 
 51. Id. at 1748. 
 52. Id. (quoting Volt Info. Sci. Inc., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1988)). 
 53. Id. at 1750. 
 54. Id. at 1750–51; see also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010). 
 55. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750. 
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Justice Scalia confronted head-on the fact that “unconscionability” is a state law 
contract defense that typically applies to contracts generally and not just arbitration 
agreements: 
When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of 
claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by 
the FAA. . . . But the inquiry becomes more complex when a doctrine 
normally thought to be generally applicable, such as duress or, as relevant 
here, unconscionability, is alleged to have been applied in a fashion that 
disfavors arbitration. In Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 . . . (1987), . . . we 
noted that the FAA’s preemptive effect might extend even to grounds 
traditionally thought to exist ‘at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.56 
He concluded that: “Although § 2’s saving clause preserves generally applicable 
contract defenses, it does not suggest an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”57 
The Court expressed concern about the slippery slope that an affirmance of the 
Ninth Circuit would have created.58 For example, could a state say that the same 
discovery permitted by courts must also be permitted in arbitration?59 Or that court 
rules such as the Federal Rules of Evidence must also be used in arbitration?60 Or 
that juries must be permitted to resolve disputes whether in court or in 
arbitration?61 If all it takes to be within the savings clause is for a state law rule to 
purport to apply to contracts generally, Justice Scalia reasoned, then the savings 
clause exception would swallow the FAA.62 He recognized that some things that 
sound like they apply to both arbitration clauses and contracts generally actually 
have a disproportionate impact on arbitration and are an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of the FAA’s purposes.63 Notably, the majority in Concepcion 
rejected the dissenters’ argument that enforcement of the class action waiver might 
cause some small-dollar consumer claims to escape judicial review: 
 56. Id. at 1747. 
 57. Id. at 1743. 
 58. Id. at 1747. 
 59. Id. (questioning whether courts could find “unconscionable or unenforceable as against public policy 
consumer arbitration agreements that fail to provide for judicially monitored discovery”). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. (“The same argument might apply to a rule classifying as unconscionable arbitration agreements . . . 
that disallow an ultimate disposition by a jury . . . .”). 
 62. Id. at 1748 (“Although § 2’s saving clause preserves generally applicable contract defenses, nothing in it 
suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s 
objectives.”). 
 63. Id. 
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The dissent claims that class proceedings are necessary to prosecute 
small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip through the legal system . . . . 
But States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, 
even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons. Moreover, the claim here was 
most unlikely to go unresolved. As noted earlier, the arbitration agreement 
provides that AT&T will pay claimants a minimum of $ 7,500 and twice 
their attorney’s fees if they obtain an arbitration award greater than 
AT&T’s last settlement offer.64 
III. Is there a Vindication of Rights Exception 
 to Concepcion? 
As discussed, Concepcion held that the FAA preempts “generally applicable contract 
defenses” if they “stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s 
objectives.”65 It then held that “[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration 
interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme 
inconsistent with the FAA.”66 Nevertheless, plaintiffs sometimes argue that even 
after Concepcion, they should be allowed to attempt to prove, through discovery or 
the presentation of factual evidence, that they cannot vindicate their rights in an 
individual arbitration. Most (but not all) courts have seen this for what it is — an 
attempt to make an end-run around Concepcion.67 
Thus, the Third, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have all held that there is no 
“vindication of rights” exception to Concepcion. In Litman v. Cellco Partnership, the 
Third Circuit initially followed the New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding in 
Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehobeth Beach that class action arbitration waivers 
“functionally exculpate wrongful conduct,” and hence are unenforceable.68 On 
remand after Concepcion, the Third Circuit did a complete turn-about and held that 
“the rule established by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Muhammad is preempted 
by the FAA.”69 
Subsequently, in Homa v. American Express, the Third Circuit held that the 
district court properly enforced a class action waiver and compelled individual 
arbitration “notwithstanding the factual record in this case establishing that 
[Homa] could not effectively vindicate his substantive statutory rights under 
[American Express’s] arbitration agreement.”70 Homa had compiled a substantial 
evidentiary record, including “Homa’s deposition, numerous attorneys’ 
 64. Id. at 1753. 
 65. Id. at 1748. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See infra Part III. 
 68. Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225, 228 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of 
Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 100 (N.J. 2006)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1046 (2012). 
 69. Id. at 231. 
 70. No. 11-3600, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 17763, at *9 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 2012) (brackets in original). 
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certifications, exhibits, and a certification of a vice president of American Express.”71 
Homa contended that “‘the uncontradicted evidentiary record in this case 
establishes that enforcing [American Express’s] arbitration clause would make it 
impossible for any person . . . to effectively vindicate his substantive statutory 
rights.’”72 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit held that, even accepting Homa’s 
argument to be true, individual arbitration was required under the FAA and 
Concepcion: “Even if Homa cannot effectively prosecute his claim in an individual 
arbitration that procedure is his only remedy, illusory or not . . . . Though some 
persons might regard our result as unfair, 9 U.S.C. § 2 requires that we reach it.”73 
In Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, Plaintiffs argued that the arbitration clause’s 
class action waiver was “unenforceable because it would exculpate ATTM from 
liability under state law . . . .”74 Plaintiffs also argued that “attorneys will refuse to 
represent ATTM customers for these legally complex but small-value claims” absent 
a class.75 Noting that Concepcion “specifically rejected this public policy argument,” 
the Eleventh Circuit held that the FAA preempted state law.76 To the extent that 
Florida law: 
[W]ould invalidate the class waiver simply because the claims are of small 
value, the potential claims are numerous, and many customers might not 
know about or pursue their potential claims absent class procedures, such a 
state policy stands as an obstacle to the FAA’s objective of enforcing 
arbitration agreements according to their terms, and is preempted.77 
Cruz also rejected the Plaintiffs’ attempt to circumvent Concepcion by proffering 
the affidavits of three Florida consumer law attorneys who attested that they would 
not represent consumers on an individual basis in claims like the Plaintiffs’ and 
statistics showing that only an “infinitesimal” number of customers had 
commenced arbitrations against Cingular.78 The Eleventh Circuit held that “faithful 
adherence to Concepcion” required the rejection of such evidence because it “goes 
only to substantiating the very public policy arguments that were expressly rejected 
by the Supreme Court in Concepcion — namely, that the class action waiver will be 
 71. Id. at *4–5. 
 72. Id. at *5 (brackets and ellipses in original). 
 73. Id. at *13 (internal citation omitted). 
 74. 648 F.3d 1205, 1212 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1212–13. 
 77. Id. at 1213. 
 78. Id. at 1214. 
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exculpatory, because most of these small-value claims will go undetected and 
unprosecuted.”79 
In Coneff v. AT & T Corp., Plaintiffs argued that Concepcion did not apply to “a 
sufficiently narrow, fact-based state-law rule for voiding class-action waivers.”80 The 
Ninth Circuit held that Concepcion “forecloses this argument,” because the majority 
opinion “expressly rejected” the argument that “the class action waiver will be 
exculpatory, because most of these small-value claims will go undetected and 
unprosecuted.”81 
Splitting with these circuits, the Second Circuit, in American Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Restaurant, ruled that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable when 
“plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that the practical effect of enforcement would be 
to preclude their ability to vindicate their federal statutory rights.”82 In American 
Express, the Plaintiffs argued that due to an anomaly in the federal antitrust laws, 
they would not be able to recover the hundreds of thousands or even millions of 
dollars in costs that would be required to present expert testimony, even if they 
prevailed on the merits of their claims.83 The subsequent denial of American 
Express’ motion for en banc review spurred vigorous dissents by the Second 
Circuit’s Chief Judge and four other judges.84 
The dissenters’ voices were heard by the Supreme Court, which on November 9, 
2012, granted American Express’ petition for writ of certiorari.85 The Court agreed 
to decide the question: “Whether the Federal Arbitration Act permits courts, 
invoking the ‘federal substantive law of arbitrability,’ to invalidate arbitration 
agreements on the ground that they do not permit class arbitration of a federal-law 
claim.”86 Justice Sonia Sotomayor took no part in the order granting certiorari, 
 79. Id. at 1214. Even prior to Concepcion, numerous courts, pointing to the ability of a prevailing plaintiff 
to recover attorneys’ fees and costs under fee-shifting provisions that are contained in most consumer 
protection statutes, rejected such attorney certifications proffered by plaintiffs to try to establish that they 
cannot vindicate his or her rights in an individual arbitration. See, e.g., Fay v. New Cingular Wireless, PCS, LLC, 
No. 4:10CV883 HEA, 2010 WL 4905698, at *3 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (enforcing arbitration clause despite affidavit 
from Plaintiff’s counsel that neither he nor any other attorney would take the individual case, because the 
theory “is clearly negated by the ability of the customer to receive attorneys’ fees”); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l 
Assoc. ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 926 (N.D. 2005) (rejecting affidavit of Plaintiff’s lawyer because it did not prove 
that “no attorney would be willing to accept such cases, particularly where attorney fees are available for 
prevailing plaintiffs”); Billups v. Bankfirst, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1274 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (rejecting affidavits of 
lawyers that class action was necessary to prosecute claim, because it was “based on the erroneous assumption 
that her costs and attorney’s fees will be paid from her damage award” instead of from statutory attorneys’ fees); 
Taylor v. Citibank USA, N.A., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1342–43 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (same). 
 80. Coneff v. AT & T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 81. Id. (quoting Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1214 (11th Cir. 2011)). 
 82. 667 F.3d 204, 212 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012). 
 83. Am. Express, 667 F.3d at 212.  
 84. In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 85. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012).  
 86. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Am. Express, 667 F.3d 204 (No. 12-133). 
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probably because she was a member of the Second Circuit panel that heard the case 
in an earlier appeal.87 
There is a very strong argument that American Express was wrongly decided. In 
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court articulated a stringent test for 
determining whether Congress intended for federal statutory claims to be excepted 
from the FAA.88 The Ninth Circuit had held that because the federal Credit Repair 
Organizations Act (CROA) has a “right to sue” clause, Congress must have 
intended to permit consumers to sue in court; therefore, CROA claims cannot be 
arbitrated.89 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that that if Congress had 
intended to prohibit the enforcement of arbitration agreements in CROA, it could 
have said so explicitly, as it has done in certain other statutes.90 “Because CROA is 
silent on whether claims under the Act can proceed in an arbitrable forum,” the 
Court said, “the FAA requires the arbitration agreement to be enforced according to 
its terms.”91 In American Express, the Second Circuit acknowledged that “the 
Sherman Act does not provide plaintiffs with an express right to bring their claims 
as a class in court.”92 Therefore, it does not pass the strict test laid down by the 
Supreme Court in Greenwood for interpreting congressional intent. Whether the 
Supreme Court follows such an argument in Italian Colors, or takes a different tack, 
should be known before the current term is over in the Spring of 2013. Oral 
argument was held on February 27, 2013.93 
IV. Will Congress and the CFPB Override Concepcion? 
Regardless of the ultimate outcome of Italian Colors, a potential threat to the use of 
class action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements is action by the CFPB. 
Several parts of the Dodd-Frank Act affect consumer arbitration, among them 
Section 1028, which requires the CFPB to “conduct a study of, and shall provide a 
report to Congress concerning, the use of agreements providing for arbitration of 
any future dispute between covered persons and consumers in connection with the 
offering or providing of consumer financial products or services.”94 It further 
provides that the CFPB “by regulation, may prohibit or impose conditions or 
limitations on the use of [such] an agreement . . . if the Bureau finds that such a 
 87. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 594; In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig, 554 F.3d 300, 302 (2d Cir. 2009), 
vacated, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010). 
 88. 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); id. at 672–73. 
 89. Id. at 669. 
 90. Id. at 675. 
 91. Id.  
 92. In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 213 n.5 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 
(2012). 
 93. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 594. 
 94. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, §1028, 124 Stat. 
1376, 2003–05 (2010). 
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prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations is in the public interest and 
for the protection of consumers.”95 
On April 24, 2012, the CFPB announced that it had initiated its study of 
consumer arbitration.96 It submitted to the Federal Register for publication a 
“Request for Information Regarding Scope, Methods, and Data Sources for 
Conducting Study of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements.”97 The CFPB described 
the Request as “a preliminary step in undertaking the study.”98 
The Request asked the public to submit comments on or before June 23, 2012, 
on four main topics dealing with the scope, methodology and data sources of the 
study: (1) the prevalence of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer 
financial services products (other than credit card agreements, on which the CFPB 
already has data); (2) claims brought by consumers against financial services 
companies in arbitration; (3) claims brought by financial services companies against 
consumers in arbitration; and (4) the impact of pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
on consumers outside particular arbitral proceedings.99 
The Request stated that comments were to be limited to the appropriate scope of 
the study, as well as appropriate methods and sources of data for conducting the 
study.100 It further stated that the CFPB was not seeking comments at this time on 
whether it should exercise its rulemaking authority or whether any regulations 
would serve to protect consumers or be in the public interest.101 
On June 22, 2012, your authors submitted extensive comments on behalf of the 
American Bankers Association, the Consumer Bankers Association and The 
Financial Roundtable.102 Many of the companies that comprise those organizations 
have arbitration provisions in their consumer contracts and have found arbitration 
to be an efficient and cost-effective manner of resolving disputes and maintain 
customer goodwill.103 They believe that arbitration offers consumers and companies 
greater benefits than either individual or class action litigation, and that those 
benefits — which include streamlined proceedings, informality, reduced cost and 
 95. Id. 
 96. Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
Launches Inquiry into Arbitration Clauses (Apr. 24, 2012), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
pressreleases/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-launches-public-inquiry-into-arbitration-clauses/. 
 97. Request for Information Regarding Scope, Methods, and Data Sources for Conducting Study of Pre-
Dispute Arbitration Agreements, 77 Fed. Reg. 25,148, 25,149–50 (Apr. 27, 2012). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 25,149. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Nessa Feddis et al., Comments on Request for Information Regarding Scope, Methods, and Data Sources 
for Conducting Study of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements (June 22, 2012), available 
at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2012-0017-0030 (CFPB Comment Letter 62212, 
June 26, 2012) [hereinafter Response]. 
 103. Id. at 2. 
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speed and ease of access — have never been more important than they are in 
today’s economy.104 
Our comment letter urged the CFPB to study the benefits that consumers derive 
from individual arbitration and to compare that to the benefits they derive from 
both individual litigation and class action litigation.105 Although the CFPB’s Request 
did not specifically mention “class actions,” they cannot be divorced from an 
examination of consumer arbitration.106 In particular, we urged the CFPB to study: 
(a) whether class actions provide meaningful benefits to the individual 
consumers as compared with individual arbitration in terms of 
outcomes, duration, costs, ease of access and consumer satisfaction;107 
(b) the costs and impact of class action lawsuits, including frivolous or 
nuisance class action lawsuits, on consumers, businesses and the 
courts;108 
(c) whether class actions are an efficient cost-effective mechanism to 
ensure compliance with the law given the range of enforcement powers 
afforded to the Bureau and other state and federal enforcement 
authorities;109 
(d) the extent to which class members (as opposed to their lawyers) 
actually benefit from class actions, as well as the economic impact of 
class actions on businesses;110 
 
 
 
 
 104. Id. at 3. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 4. 
 107. Id. at 8. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Many class action settlements occur not because the lawsuits have merit — indeed, many are nuisance 
suits — but because of the in terrorem threat of costly and drawn-out litigation that class actions pose. And 
while plaintiffs’ lawyers often rake in substantial fees, the individual class member is frequently left with a 
coupon or a check for a few dollars. Id. at 9. 
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(e) the fact that there is empirical proof that class actions are not 
necessary for consumers to vindicate their statutory rights;111 
Year Truth in Lending Act (TILA) 
Individual Actions 
TILA Class Actions 
2002 539 (94% of total) 37 (6% of total) 
2003 474 (93% of total) 39 (7% of total) 
2004 554 (97% of total) 20 (3% of total) 
2005 473 (97% of total) 19 (3% of total) 
2006 671 (98% of total) 17 (2% of total) 
2007 665 (95% of total) 40 (5% of total) 
2008 733 (94% of total) 51 (6% of total) 
2009 1,320 (97% of total) 40 (3% of total) 
2010 928 (98% of total) 17 (2% of total) 
2011 539 (98% of total) 15 (2% of total) 
(f) whether the ability of the CFPB and other agencies to handle 
aggregated small dollar claims is more effective than class actions in 
deterring corporate misconduct;112 
(g) whether class actions are not necessary to make consumers aware of 
the existence of a claim;113 
(h) to take into account the many types of informal dispute resolution 
processes — including the error and dispute resolution procedures 
 111. According to the LexisNexis CourtLink
® 
database, over the past decade, 93% to 98% of all TILA claims 
brought in the federal courts were brought as individual actions, rather than class actions, even though TILA 
expressly permits class actions to be brought. Id. at 8. That is because TILA permits a successful plaintiff to 
recover his or her attorneys’ fees and costs, and thereby provides an incentive for an attorney to represent the 
plaintiff in an individual action even in small dollar cases. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (2006). 
 112. The CFPB should study the effect of actual and threatened governmental action by the CFPB, the FTC, 
the Department of Justice and state attorneys general and other enforcement agencies on corporate behavior 
and whether it reduces the alleged need for class actions to encourage compliance with the law. In addition, the 
CFPB should study whether the interests of consumers are better protected through actions brought by 
governmental agencies, as opposed to private class action lawyers, since the former act in the public interest 
while the latter have an economic stake in the case, and whether governmental agencies do a better job than the 
private bar at determining and prioritizing which actions should be pursued in order to further the “public 
interest.” Response, supra note 102, at 11. 
 113. The CFPB should study the role played in modern society by the internet and social media in alerting 
consumers to alleged corporate misconduct. It should examine the impact of internet “gripe sites” frequented 
by consumers and the capacity of alleged corporate wrongdoing to go “viral” on the internet and become 
known immediately to consumers. It should also study the extent to which websites and databases maintained 
by government enforcement agencies (including the CFPB) that encourage consumers to “tell their story” and 
submit complaints help educate other consumers to particular issues and potential claims. Id. 
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provided by federal and state law, those maintained internally by 
businesses and those offered by regulatory agencies (including the 
CFPB) and private organizations (such as the Better Business Bureau);114 
(i) the extent to which consumers resolve their disputes with businesses 
through online dispute resolution, which uses technology to facilitate 
the resolution of disputes between parties;115 
(j) to take account of the fact that most consumer arbitration 
agreements in use today contain numerous consumer-friendly features 
that make individual arbitration a more advantageous forum for 
resolving consumer disputes than the courts;116 and 
(k) whether consumers, businesses and the courts could benefit from 
having debt collection disputes resolved in arbitration instead of court.117 
Our comment letter to the CFPB also emphasized the numerous empirical studies 
which have concluded that arbitration is more beneficial to consumers than 
litigation.118 
 114. In the lives of consumers and in the marketplace, all of these alternative dispute resolution procedures 
are inextricably intertwined and provide a necessary context for the study of consumer arbitration. Id. 
 115. There are companies and organizations that provide online dispute resolution services both nationally 
and internationally. Understanding the extent to which consumers resolve disputes through online dispute 
resolution services will help to place more traditional consumer arbitration services and other alternative 
dispute resolution procedures in the proper context. Indeed, because online dispute resolution is the only 
practical way of resolving international consumer disputes, curtailment of consumer arbitration by the CFPB 
could throw a monkey wrench into the use of online dispute resolution and harm international transactions 
over the internet. Id. at 7. 
 116. Id. at 14. 
 117. Id. at 16. 
 118. See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, OUTCOMES OF ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CONSUMER LENDING 
CASES (2004), available at http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/ 
2005ErnstAndYoung.pdf (finding that: consumers prevailed more often than businesses in cases that went to an 
arbitration hearing; consumers obtained favorable results, including settlements, in 79% of reviewed cases; and 
consumers surveyed were largely satisfied with the arbitration process); HARRIS INTERACTIVE, ARBITRATION: 
SIMPLER, CHEAPER, AND FASTER THAN LITIGATION 5 (2005), available at http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/ 
documents/ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/2005HarrisPoll.pdf (reporting strong satisfaction with arbitration 
results and process, including speed and simplicity); ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, TASK FORCE ON A.D.R. 
EFFECTIVENESS, SURVEY ON ARBITRATION (2003), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/taskforces/ 
adr/surveyreport.pdf (indicating that 78% of trial attorneys find arbitration faster than lawsuits and 86% of trial 
attorneys find that arbitration costs are equal to or less than lawsuit costs); MICHAEL A. PERINO, REPORT TO THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION REGARDING ARBITRATOR CONFLICT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN 
NASD AND NYSE SECURITIES ARBITRATIONS 35 (2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/arbconflict.pdf 
(finding that 93% of consumers using arbitration find it to be fair); Mark Fellows, The Same Result as in Court, 
More Efficiently: Comparing Arbitration and Court Litigation Outcomes, 14 METRO. CORP. COUNSEL 32 (2006) 
(comparing “win” rates and case durations from disclosed consumer arbitration awards in California with 
publicly available outcome information from the Bureau of Judicial Statistics on litigated contract cases 
involving individuals in the seventy-five largest counties in the United States and concluding that (a) consumers 
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In 2009, the Searle Civil Justice Institute of Northwestern University School of 
Law released the first in-depth study of consumer arbitrations administered by the 
AAA.119 The study, which was based on a review of 301 consumer arbitrations that 
were closed by award between April and December 2007, reached the following 
conclusions: (1) The upfront cost of arbitration for consumer claimants is quite low 
(an average of $96 for claims less than $10,000 and $219 for claims between $10,000 
and $75,000);120 (2) AAA consumer arbitration is an expeditious way to resolve 
disputes (an average of 6.9 months);121 (3) Consumers won some relief in 53.3% of 
the cases filed and recovered an average of $19,255 (52.1% of the amount 
claimed);122 (4) No statistically significant repeat-player effect was identified using a 
traditional definition of repeat-player business;123 (5) Arbitrators awarded attorneys’ 
fees to prevailing consumers in 63.1% of cases in which the consumer sought such 
an award and the average attorneys’ fee award was $14,574;124 (6) A substantial 
majority of consumer arbitration clauses (76.6%) fully complied with the AAA Due 
Process Protocol;125 (7) AAA’s review of arbitration clauses for Protocol compliance 
was effective (98.2% of the time) at identifying and responding to clauses with 
Protocol violations;126 (8) AAA refused to administer a significant number of 
consumer cases because of Protocol violations by businesses;127 (9) As a result of 
AAA’s Protocol compliance review, some businesses either waive problematic 
provisions or revise arbitration clauses to remove provisions that violate the 
Protocol.128 
A second study by the same organization, this one involving debt collection, 
showed that: “[C]onsumers prevailed more often in arbitration than in court . . . . 
who brought arbitration claims against businesses prevailed in 65.5% of cases, while plaintiffs litigating contract 
claims in court prevailed 61.5% of the time overall, and (b) the median duration for arbitrations was 4.35 
months, compared with 19.4 months for court lawsuits); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment 
Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 48, 63 (1998) (concluding that employees 
collectively receive 10.4% of their demand in litigation, compared with 18% in arbitration, and that “arbitration 
holds the potential to make workplace justice truly available to rank-and-file employees for the first time in our 
history”). 
 119. Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitration, 25 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOLUTION 843, 843 (2010). 
 120. Id. at 845. These amounts are below the levels specified in the AAA fee schedule for low-cost 
arbitrations and are the result of arbitrators reallocating consumer costs to businesses. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (AAA) OFFERS TWO FEE SCHEDULES, available at http://www.adr.org/ 
aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_012009 (last accessed Apr. 9, 2013). 
 121. Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 119, at 845. 
 122. Id. at 845–46. 
 123. Id. at 846. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration 5 (University 
of Kansas School of Law, Working Paper No. 2011-4, 2011). 
 126. Response, supra note 102, at 5. 
 127. Id. In 2007, AAA refused to administer at least 85 consumer cases, and likely at least 129 consumer 
cases (9.4% of its case load) because the business failed to comply with the Protocol. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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[T]he likelihood of creditors winning in arbitration is less than in court.”129 The 
authors further concluded that “nothing in our study provides any evidence of 
biased outcomes in arbitration.”130 
The CFPB has not announced whether it will permit further public input in its 
arbitration study or when the study will be completed. 
V. Conclusion 
Concepcion’s validation of class action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements 
was a landmark ruling, but may not have been the last word on the subject. 
Observers on both sides of the class action waiver issue are eagerly awaiting the 
Supreme Court’s forthcoming decision in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant and the CFPB’s release of its arbitration study. 
 
 129. Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Creditor Claims in Arbitration and in Court, 7 HASTINGS 
BUS. L.J. 77, 80 (2011). 
 130. Id. at 83; see also Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer Arbitration: 
What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1051 (2009) (study based upon an analysis of data derived from 
debt collection arbitrations commenced by creditors concluded that “the consumer arbitration process provides 
a more pro-consumer environment for claims adjudication than does the traditional court system”). 
